Cynicism masquerading as a political strategy

Alan Scott, "Development Theory and the Constitution of Market Society: A Polanyian View" Comparative Sociology.

In its latter capacity [as "market modifier"] the state is, and indeed must be, the legitimate and prime target of claims making with respect to the defence of society, social groups and communities against self-regulating markets.

The dilemma for radical approaches is thus twofold: the non-appearance of its targeted addressees on the one hand, and the rejection of policy bodies and policy makers as potential addressees on the other. The result is that much of the left has evacuated the field of policy debate. This leaves us in a situation where we find, on the one side, a frequently Panglossian discourse of “good governance” and, on the other, self-marginalizing critique. The “neo-liberal” project has had a smooth ride through the middle. And yet, even those institutions and individuals charged with governing the latest wave of deregulation and the free flow of real and fictitious commodities have become increasingly aware of the adverse effects. So, the policy debate goes on, but it does so on a terrain on which a broadly Polanyian approach provides the best hope for defending communities and “social assets” against markets, and for supporting regulation. The price to pay for participating in such debates is a lowering of expectations: with no post-capitalist option in prospect and no realistic opt out from the international system at the national level, hopes must rest on a partial defence against the effects of markets; a partial reembedding of the economy. This is the context, rather than the brute fact of the current global financial crisis referred to at the start of the paper, that makes Polanyi’s analysis once more relevant: his position is closer to those (progressive) voices which do get heard in policy circles.

No political movement--whether based on class or nationalism--is to be realistically expected, and so if there is to be any blunting of neoliberalism, it is only going to be achieved by "participating in [policy] debates." When, where, and with whom is not entirely clear, but the implication is officials of states and other institutions "charged with governing the latest wave of deregulation and the free flow of real and fictitious commodities," which presumably includes the IMF and the World Bank, as well as aid agencies and major donors. In other words, moderate your demands and you'll have a shot at convincing elites of the necessity of "a partial defence against the effects of markets; a partial reembedding of the economy."

It's true that there don't appear to be more radical alternatives on the immediate horizon, but the author seems to be taking this as evidence that trying to convince officials has a chance of working. Saying that officials of international organizations are "increasingly aware of the adverse effects" of unrestrained markets is perhaps an understatement, but it is true that the neoliberal language of the World Bank (for instance) was seriously toned down beginning in the late 90s. However, it's not like the underlying ideology has changed, it's just expressed with more caution. Is there really an opening for a "Polanyian approach"? Has neoliberalism been ascendant for lack of convincing ideological competitors?

Considering the continued dominance of supposedly market-perfecting "structural reform" as the political agenda, for instance in Europe during its ongoing crisis, despite the repeated financial blowups of the past couple decades, one has to suspect that the policies keep getting put forward because despite their costs for most people, they've been working quite well for someone. Or perhaps, it'd be more accurate to say something--perhaps financial capital, perhaps transnational capital, perhaps nothing more complicated than each individual country's elites. If it's working fine for them, and if "defense" would entail at least constraining their interests, it going to be hard to convince the bureaucrats and intellectuals who have made careers giving them what they want that a new approach is needed. This is of course what social movements are for: the mechanism by which the injury to the interests of non-elite social groups is transmuted into a cost to the elites, giving them a compelling reason to accept the lasting but predictable costs of concessions.